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FAR EASTERN SECTION
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CHINA'S NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
Cm-Yu Wu*
China's new Constitution was passed in the Constituent National
Assembly on December 25, 1946, and formally promulgated on January
1, 1947 According to the attached Procedural Articles, the first step
in enforcing the Constitution is the amending and revision of the
existing laws and decrees which are in conflict with the Constitution.
The second step consists of drafting and promulgating within a period
of three months after the promulgation of the Constitution certain new
laws such as (i) the law governing the organization of the National
Assembly, (2) the law governing the election and recall of the repre-
sentatives of the National Assembly, (3) the law governing the elec-
tion and recall of the President and the Vice-President, (4) the law
governing the election and recall of the members of the Legislative
Yuan, (5) the law governing the election and recall of the members of
the Control Yuan, (6) the five laws governing the organization of the
five Yuan respectively These were what we usually labelled as the
"Ten Constitution-enforcing Laws," and they were duly drafted and
finished as scheduled. The third step consists of the election of the
representatives to the National Assembly, of the members of the Legis-
lative Yuan, and of the members of the Control Yuan-elections which
are supposed to be finished within a period of six months after the
promulgation of the respective laws governing their election and recall.
The fourth step consists of the convocation of the National Assem-
bly and the election of the President and the Vice-President, the date
for the former being specified in the Procedural Articles. The fifth
step consists of the voluntary Convocation of the Legislative Yuan
and the reorganization of the Executive Yuan. The sixth step consists
of the convocation of the Control Yuan and the seventh and eighth
steps consist of the election of the President and Vice-President of the
Judicial Yuan and the members to the Council of the Grand Judges
and the election of the President and Vice-President of the Examina-
tion Yuan. With the completion of these steps the Constitution is
* Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chinese government; Professor of
Political Science, Central University, Nanking.
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supposed to have begun its full function as far as the central govern-
ment is concerned.
At the time of this writing all the eight steps have already been
completed. It hardly needs saying that each of these steps has its own
legal problems and will, therefore, make an interesting study for stu-
dents of law Especially so are the legal problems that arose out of the
election disputes and those that arose out of the organization and
procedure of the Legislative Yuan, etc. Space, of course, does not allow
elaborate treatment of all these subjects here. The author will, there-
fore, limit his task to tackling the legal problems which the convoca-
tion of the National Assembly has given rise to.
THE THEORY AND THE NATURE OF THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
It is usually understood that the drafting of China's new Constitu-
tion of 1946 has been greatly influenced on one hand by the teachings
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the late founder of the Kuomintang, and now
worshipped as the "Father of the Chinese Republic," and on the other
hand by the political realities existing at the time of the drafting. For
the time being we will avoid discussing this latter point. Of the teach-
ings of Dr. Sun four things or theories are known to have especially
influenced the content and nature of the new Constitution, and they
are (i) Three People's Principles- in Chinese, San Min Chu I-
(2) his theory of political or popular power and governmental power
or function, (3) his theory of the five-power constitution, and (4) his
theory of equal division of power between the central and local gov-
ernments.
So far as concerns the National Assembly, it is the number two
theory mentioned above which furnished it with theoretical basis.
According to this theory, the originality of which is claimed by Dr.
Sun, a division ought to be drawn between the power exercised by
people in their capacity as politically sovereign and the power exer-
cised by the government as the people's agent. In his opinion, democ-
racy means participation in the government by all the people. They
are the sovereign body of the state and are supposed to have the
highest power.
But on the other hand, the majority of the people are usually an
ignorant and unconscious mass, unable or incompetent to administer
the affairs of the state. They must delegate this administration to the
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enlightened and conscious few, reserving to themselves the power to
control and direct the government. In Dr. Sun's terminology, thus
latter power is called "Chen Chuan," that is, the political power, while
the power of the government is called "Chi Chuan," which is the
governing or administering power. In this way he thinks that the
question of the difficulty of harmonizing or avoiding the conflict be-
twen freedom and authority or the question of the relation between
the people and the government can be satisfactorily solved. Of Chen
Chuan, or the political power, Dr. Sun mentioned four categories which
are election, recall, initiative, and referendum; of the Chi Chuan or
governmental power he mentioned five categories which are legislative,
executive, judicial, examng, and controlling. The exercise of these
latter five powers of the government are subject to the control of the
four superior powers located in the people.'
Dr. Sun was, however, not very clear as to how these four powers
should be exercised, that is, whether they should be exercised directly
by the people or indirectly by their representatives. Thus in his last
lecture on the Min Chuan Chu I (that is, democracy), he seemed as
a whole to be inclined towards the direct exercise of these powers by
the people. He said: "After China has a strong government, we need
not, like the peoples of Europe and America, fear that our government
may have too much power, and is therefore incapable of being man-
aged. The reason is that in our plan there will be a division of the
great political powers into two categories within the state which we
intend to establish. They are (i) the political power which is to be
put into the hands of the people so that people will have ample power
to directly manage the affairs of the state. This is what we call peoples'
power." Even more explicit is what is said later in the same lecture
about the nature of the four powers of election, recall, initiative, and
referendum.' "When people have those four powers, then they will
have ample power. A democracy can be called thorough and direct
only when the people are endowed with those four powers. In the past
when the democracy was still deficient, people could not interfere with
the government after the officials are elected. This is what we call in-
direct democracy, which is the same thing as the representative form
of government in which only the representatives but not the people
directly have any control over the government. In order to enable the
1 See Dr. Sun's lectures on Min Chuan Chu I, especially his sixth lecture.
Ibid
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people to directly control the government, it is necessary for the people
to be endowed with those four powers. A government can be called a
popular government only when people can exercise these four powers.""
This trend of thought is also conspicuous when later in the same lec-
ture he spoke of political powers of the people in Switzerland as direct
political powers.
A quite different note was, however, struck by him in Chien Kuo Ta
Kan (an outline of China's reconstruction) There he seemed to favor
a division of fields between the people and their representatives with
regard to the exercise of these four powers. Thus, for example, in
Article 9 of this famous document he maintained that in an entirely
self-governing ksten the people shall have the power of electing and
recalling directly their officials and exercising directly the power of
initiative and referendum. Then in Article 14 of the same document
he maintained that after the establishment of the local self-government
in every hsten, one representative can be elected from each such unit
to form the National Assembly to participate in the affairs of the
central government. Again in Article 24 of the same document he said
that after the promulgation of the Constitution, the central governing
power shall be transferred to the National Assembly for its exercise,
that is to say, that the Assembly shall have the right of electing and
recalling the officials of the central government, and the right of mitia-
tive and referendum concerning the legislation of matters within the
jurisdiction of the central government.
In all these articles there is thus no doubt that Dr. Sun was inclined
towards division between the people and the National Assembly of
what he termed as political powers and that his thoughts here do some-
how conflict with what he stood for in the Three Peoples' Principles.
The designers of the 1946 Constitution certainly must have been
confronted with this conflict. But it sems quite clear that ultimately it
is the principles in Chien Kuo Ta Kan which they finally adopted, for
we notice that both direct and indirect exercise of the four political
powers are being provided for in the Constitution and their fields
marked out. According to the Constitution, for example, in the kslen,
the people are to exercise the power to elect and recall the magistrate
and also the power of initiative and referendum when laws for the
exercise of these powers have been passed. Then the people also
exercise the right of electing members to the different representative
8 Ibid.
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organs beginning with the Peoples' Council of the hsten up to the
Legislative Yuan. Also they have the right to elect the governor of the
province. In all these cases, the exercise of Chen Chuan is direct.' But
in many other cases the exercise of such power is, however, indirect
and entrusted to the National Assembly, the members of which are
elected by the people and subject to their recall.
These cases include (i) election of the President and Vice-President,
(2) their recall, (3) amending the Constitution, (4) ratification of the
amendment to the Constitution proposed by the Legislative Yuan.
Besides these powers the National Assembly is also supposed to exer-
cise the power of initiative and referendum in the future when these
powers have been exercised by the people of half the number of all the
hsien within the country The National Assembly is then to formulate
a law for the exercise of these powers.5 Aside from the power to amend
the Constitution which will be discussed later, it is quite clear from
the above analysis that the designers of China's 3946 Constitution
have meant to make the National Assembly an organ of political power
to exercise the rights of election, recall, initiative, and referendum
more or less as a parallel with the people who are endowed with the
same rights within somehow different fields.
Several points have to be raised here: (i) Although respective fields
have been marked out for the exercise of political powers by the people
on the one hand and by the National Assembly on the other, such
fields have, however, not been very clearly defined throughout. Thus
the people in the hsten are given the right of initiative and referendum
while the National Assembly is also to exercise these powers in due
course of time. But what are the respective fields for their exercise of
these rights, and who should have the overriding authority or priority
in case of conflict? These questions remain to be answered. (2) But
the more interesting point is perhaps the fact that under the present
constitutional arrangement the political powers exercised by the
National Assembly are somehow differentiated from those exercised
by the people directly and thus make Dr. Sun's original distinction
between what he calls political power and what he calls governmental
4 Articles 123, 126, 124, 113. Here it is to be noted that the 1947 Constitution does not
deal with municipalities in such a detailed way as with Hsin. But of the two lands of
municipalities it is stipulated in the Constitution (Article 128) that all the provisions in
the Constitution pertaining to Hnen are equally applicable to the ordinary municipalities,
while the special large municipalities directly under the control of the Executive Yuan
will be regulated by special legislation (Article 118). But it is presumed that the citizens
in the municipalities will enjoy the same rights as those of the H"en.
5 Article 27
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power questionable. Put in another way, the question is, "Can the
powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum still be called
direct or political powers when they are not exercised by the people
themselves directly, but by their representatives?" Will not the very
fact of the representatives being elected and subject to recall by the
people take out the powers they exercise from the field of political
powers and reduce them to the same level of governmental powers?
For what is the difference between the nature of these powers exer-
cised by the National Assembly and that of those powers exercised by
the Legislative Yuan and the other branches of the government when
the exercise of such powers is equally subject to the ultimate control
of the people? Certainly it will look most preposterous for the Assem-
bly to claim any political or legal superiority of its powers under such
circumstances, and the exercise by it in any form of overriding author-
ity over common legislation will, of course, be absolutely meaningless
and illogical.
On the same basis of reasoning, it is anticipated that upon the as-
sumption of the powers of initiaitve and referendum by the National
Assembly in the future, not only will the legal plan of these powers
be lowered but the substance of these powers will be coextensive with
those of the Legislative Yuan and of the Control Yuan, thus most
likely bringing into existence in China a three-chamber representative
system in contradistinction to the West's single-chamber or double-
chamber system. Thus, aside from the power of consent in the case
of the appointment of the Premier, the Legislative Yuan is generally
entrusted with the power to decide upon any statutory or budgetary
bill or any bill concerning martial law, general amnesty, declaration
of war, conclusion of peace, treaties, and other important affairs of
the state.8 Again, Control Yuan, according to the Constitution, is to
exercise the power of impeachment, rectification, and auditing, besides
the power of consent in the case of some important appointments.- But
it is submitted that all these powers, with the possible exception of the
power of consent, also fall within the scope of the powers of initiative
and referendum. In due course of time it is thus quite probable that
through the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum the
National Assembly may develop and grow to be just another repre-
sentative organ duplicating and complicating the work of both the
Legislative and the Control Yuan. A delicate problem of operation and
6 Article 63.
7 Article 70.
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adjustment will then certainly come up to tax the legal minds and
political talents of those concerned. But one point may be mentioned
here in anticipation of future developments, that is, the possible
emergence of a situation where the Assembly, which is elected for a
term of six years, may be allowed to enjoy overriding authority of the
Legislative Yuan, which, being elected for only three years, will
usually be reorgamzed in the middle of the representatives' tenure,
and therefore much more representative of the people's will and opin-
ion, at least during the latter three years of the National Assembly's
six years of incumbency 8 An organ somehow out of touch with the
popular will may thus be allowed to whip an organ which is much
more abreast with it. The designers of the 1946 Constitution, it seems,
are somehow conscious of this, and that is why they have not author-
ized the immediate exercise of the powers of the initiative and ref-
erendum by the National Assembly
(3) Finally, it is submitted that the function of recalling the Presi-
dent, which is entrusted to the Assembly under the present arrange-
ment, may never work and will forever remain a dead letter. The
reason is that by subjecting the representative to popular recall,' the
Constitution really puts into the hand of the President or the Vice-
President an important club against any move to dislodge him from
his presidential position. In case of any such move being fomented,
the President can always outmaneuver it by trying to persuade the
people to recall those representatives who move to recall the President.
A most undesirable political confusion will then probably result. Next,
it is also to be noted that neither the Constitution of 1946 nor the
Electoral Law forbid the incumbent officials of the government from
running for seats in the National Assembly As a consequence, most
if not all of the representatives of the present session have an official
capacity of one type or another, and it is expected that without some
change of law the situation will be the same in the future. The repre-
sentatives will thus most likely be submissive rather than bellicose
towards those in power, and this will of course very much reduce the
effectiveness of recall as a weapon against the incumbent President or
the Vice-President.
As to the power to amend the Constitution, it should be noted that
it is Dr. Sun's idea that the Assembly should have the Constituent
8 Articles 28 and 65.
0 Articles 34 and 133.
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power. Thus in Articles 22 and 23 of Chien Kuo Ta Kan, it is stipu-
lated that the constitutional draft should be prepared by the Legisla-
tive Yuan but should be decided and promulgated by the Assembly
upon the establishment of self-government in half the provinces of the
country This same idea also appears in his article, "History of China's
Revolution." Acting in accordance with this teaching, the Constituent
National Assembly was summoned to met in 1946, and it placed the
power to amend the Constitution among other powers of the Assembly
Here, one point needs to be made clear-the constituent function of
the Assembly is essentially different from other function or powers of
the Assembly such as initiative, referendum, etc. And this for three
reasons. First, it is submitted that the nature and substance of the
power of amending the Constitution is far more important than the
other powers of the Assembly The difference here is not merely one
of degree, but one of kind. Secondly, it is submitted that while in the
exercise of the power of initiative the Assembly may just be sharing
ordinary legislation with other representative organs of the govern-
ment, therefore reducing its dignity No such possibility will, however,
arise in the Assembly exercising the right of amending the Constitu-
tion, as according to the Constitution this is made the exclusive and
unique right of the Assembly, not to be shared with other organs,
except in one instance where the Legislative Yuan may propose an
amendment to be submitted to the Assembly for its ratification."0
But even more important than the two previous points is the point
that the exercise of the power to amend the Constitution takes a special
procedure and a special quorum" in contradistinction to the majority
vote of one form or another as is required in the transaction of ordi-
nary business. This is very important because it puts the Constituent
power of the Assembly on a higher legal plane than its other functions
and endows it with another capacity which other representative organs
cannot claim. The Assembly thus has two very distinct capacities:
(i) the capacity of a Constituent Assembly in which it exercises the
right of constitution amending and (2) the capacity of an ordinary
representative organ in which it exercises its other functions in one
or another form of majority quorum. This distinction is extremely
significant because it is the constituent capacity that marks off the
National Assembly from the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan,
and also in its other capacity as an ordinary representative organ
10 Article 174.
11 Ibid.
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exercising the right of election, recall, initiative, and referendum. As
an ordinary representative organ both the Legislative Yuan and Con-
trol Yuan and the second capacity of the Assembly are all inferior and
subject to the superior capacity of the Assembly as a Constituent
Assembly Also it is to be noted that it is in a superior capacity that
the Assembly may claim to be the legal sovereign of China, strictly
speaking, displaying its legal omnipotence.
Next in point of effective functioning as a popular representative
organ, it needs to be made clear that the exercise by the Assembly of
the powers entrusted to it by the Constitution is rendered rather diffi-
cult by its unwieldy size besides the points raised above. According to
the Constitution, the Assembly is to consist of members elected by
seven different groups, including territorial, occupational, national,
etc. 2 Consequently 3,045 representatives are supposed to be elected
from these seven groups according to the present computation table
attached to the Electoral Law made in accordance with the Constitu-
tion."' With this size it is difficult for the Assembly to use its powers
effectively and wisely Nor is it easy for any body or group to effec-
tively control it. As formulated in the Constitution, the National As-
sembly is thus a popular representative organ of double capacity, but
at the same time of rather unwieldy size.
THE INTENDED ASSIGNMENT OF THE FIRST SESSION
Legally speaking, the first session of the National Assembly could
exercise only two functions: (i) the election of the President and the
Vice-President and (2) the amendment of the Constitution if members
so desired. The function of recall could hardly be exercised when the
President and the Vice-President were yet to be elected, nor could
the function of ratifying any proposal for amending the Constitution
made by the Legislative Yuan be exercised in view of the fact that the
new Legislative Yuan was yet to meet. Also the functions of general
initiative and referendum would remain a dead letter for some time
to come in view of the contingent conditions of their exercise having
not yet been fulfilled. Therefore, the legal functions of the first session
of the Assembly were relatively brief, to embrace at most only the
election of the President and the Vice-President and the amendment
of the Constitution.
Not to touch the Constitution in this first session of the Assembly
12 Article 26.
18 See Table attached to Electoral Law of March 31, 1947
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is the settled policy of the government leaders of a section of the
Kuomintang members and all members of the Youth and the Demo-
cratic Socialist Parties. Two reasons were back of this policy First,
from the theoretical standpoint, it is argued that no amendment of the
Constitution should be entertained since it has not gone into effect to
allow any intelligent opinion to be formed about its strengths and
weaknesses. But more important than this is perhaps the reason that
the 1946 Constitution is a delicate comprormse among the political
parties in China, and no amendment can be accepted without violating
the whole balance so nicely achieved, and without reconsidering the
whole question of party cooperation all over again. Both the Youth
Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, therefore, considered the
amendment as a rather provocative move to be avoided at all cost, and
the government leaders, being anxious to keep up the masquerade of
a united front of all the three parties, were also anxious to evade the
issue. There was thus an agreement among the high circles in the
government that the assignment of the first session of the National
Assembly should be strictly limited to the election of the President and
the Vice-President of China, and that the issues of amending the Con-
stitution should be avoided at all costs.
THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE DEVELOPMENTS
OF THE FIRST SESSION
A. THE QUESTION OF ORGANIZATION
According to Article 34 of the Constitution, the organization of the
assembly is to be dealt with by ordinary legislation, and according to
the Procedural Articles annexed to the Constitution, the promulgation
of this law was scheduled to take place within a period of three months
after the promulgation of the Constitution. This was duly carried out
by the former Legislative Yuan, and the law for the organization of
the National Assembly was formally promulgated on March 21, the
thirty-sixth year of the Republic (i937) A point both of law and
political wisdom can, perhaps, be raised here, and that is whether the
Legislative Yuan, an inferior legal body, should have the right to
legislate for the organization of the National Assembly which, as shown
previously, is a superior legal authority in some respects. Certainly it
looks somehow strange, if not preposterous, to have the organization
law enacted in this way, and politically it would also look rather un-
wise as will be shown later.
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The reason for the arrangement is perhaps to be found in the fact
that it is much easier to steer through the passage of the law in the
former Legislative Yuan than it is in the National Assembly in view
of the latter's unwieldy size and heterogeneous opimons. This is espe-
cially so in view of the fact that it seems to be the policy of the govern-
ment to somehow strait-jacket the power and function of the Assembly
But since tins is the only law governing the organization of the Assem-
bly, a brief survey of it is perhaps called for. The quorum of the
Assembly is provided both in the Procedural Articles annexed to the
Constitution " and the Orgamzation Law According to the former all
the elected representative organs like the National Assembly, the Legis-
lative Yuan, and the Control Yuan may be convened for legal business
if and when two-thirds of their members have been duly elected during
the six months' period as provided for in the same instrument. As far
as the National Assembly is concerned, this means two-thirds of the
legal number of 3,045 as fixed by the Electoral Law Tns quorum was,
of course, duly elected and the Assembly was thus summoned to con-
vene on March 29, 1948. As to the quorum for each meeting, it is
stipulated in the Organization Law that a majority of all the repre-
sentatives must be present before the meeting can be called to order,
and that except as otherwise provided for in the Constitution and in
other laws, a vote of the majority of those present is required for
passing any motion.1
Other articles in the Organization Law provide for (i) oath by the
members, (2) the size and election of the Presidium, (3) the nomma-
tion and the election to the Committee on Credentials, the Committee
on Bills, the Committee on Discipline, and in case of necessity the
formation of ad hoc committees, (4) the ways of voting, (5) the au-
thority of the presiding officer over order of the floor and the discipline
of the individual members, (6) the function of the Secretariat, Secre-
tary-General and Deputy Secretary Generals and (7) the preparation
of the agenda by the Presidium, and (8) the termination of the ses-
sion. 6 Many of these points have been debated in Assembly during
the course of its discussion. Thus, for example, the function of the Com-
mitte on Discipline and the Committee on Credentials has given rise
to quite a number of speeches, and there is no doubt that each of these
points has its own legal problems. It is therefore not practicable for us
14 Article 8 of the Procedural Articles.15 Article 8 of the Orgamzation Law; also cf. Article 9.
l6 Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.
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to go into these points one by one. But at least one point has to be
discussed here because of its political as well as legal significance; this
relates to the size and the election of the Presidium.
The author is not aware of the existence of such a body as the pre-
sidium in the legislative houses in the more advanced democratic
countries. There the presiding officer regularly consists of only a single
person variously called the speaker, the chairman, etc. The idea of
a collective body of persons discharging the functions of the speaker
and of the steering committee, or even serving as a sort of whip or
liaison, seems to be transported from Russia to China. But suffice it
to say that this practice has now hardened into a custom in China not
to be lightly departed from. We thus find such a body provided for
both in the Organization Law of the present National Assembly as
well as the Organization Law of the previous Assembly which made
the Constitution.
The functions of this Presidium according to the Organization Law
of the present Assembly are as follows: (i) the determination of the
agenda, (2) business administration of the Assembly, and (3) other
such matters as provided for by the Organization Law itself."' But the
point especially worthy of attention is that while the former Constitu-
tion-making Assembly, a body about half the size of the present
Assembly, had a Presidium of thirty-one members, 8 this latter was
provided with a Presidium of only twenty-five members in spite of its
almost double size. This certainly looks inconsistent. The explanation
is perhaps to be found in the wish of the government to make the
Presidium more pliable to their manipulation and influence. But in the
Assembly it was generally considered as an outrageous legal absurdity
and entirely inadequate to enable all sections and talents to be repre-
sented in the Presidium. A more compelling reason was perhaps the
fact that many members, especially the novices in the Assembly,
wanted to have a chance of showing themselves before the Assembly
Dissatisfaction towards the Organization Law on this point was there-
fore very general on the floor.
Next, the representatives also found reasons for dissatisfaction with
the method of nomination and election of the members of the Pre-
sidium. There is nothing on this point in the Orgamzation Law other
than the provision that the twenty-five members should be mutually
elected from among the representatives. With a view to facilitate the
17 Article 5.
18 See Article 7 of the Orgamzation Law of May 21, 1937
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election, and perhaps not without the intention to manipulate it, the
Preparatory Committee of the National Assembly offered to the As-
sembly a draft bill for this purpose. Its notable features are (i) voting
by list ballot, (2) election by plurality vote, (3) nomination by the
respective territorial, occupational groups, etc., and (4) additional
nomination for each additional thirty representatives in case the
groups' representatives exceed the starting numeral of thirty " To the
majority of the representatives, this arrangement was entirely un-
acceptable, and it became a moot point in the Assembly, together with
the question of the size of the Presidium.
We cannot go into the details of the debate on the floor. Suffice it to
say that after some heated debate it was finally decided to increase the
size of the Presidium and to refer to the former Legislative Yuan for
its decision on the question of revising the Organization Law 20 As to
the method of nomination and election, the original bill was also
amended so as to (i) eliminate the list ballot method of voting and
substitute the single ticket system in its place, (2) to provide for
nomination of one person from each group, irrespective of its size, and
an additional nomination by any ten representatives irrespective of
their group affiliation.2 There is, of course, no doubt that the Assembly
has full authority to choose the way in which it will nominate and elect
its Presidium. The question in this connection is, therefore, one of
political wisdom rather than one of legal niceties. As to the question
of the size of the Presidium it is enough to say that the proposal to
increase the size of the Presidium was accepted by the former Legis-
lative Yuan, which revised the Organization Law so as to read that
the Presidium should consist of eighty-five members instead of the
original twenty-five. 2 The question was thus happily solved and the
Assembly proceeded to the election of its Presidium.
But here a point of law should be noticed, and that is that the
Assembly would certainly have been placed in a legal dilemma if and
when the Legislative Yuan should refuse to amend the Organization
Law to suit the amour propre of the Assembly Under such circum-
stances, and pending the assumption by the Assembly of the power of
initiative and referendum, the alternative facing the Assembly would
be to either (i) accept the decision of the Legislative Yuan no matter
19 See the agenda for the first preparatory meeting, especially the Draft Bill on the
Method of Electing the Presidium attached to the Agenda.2 0 Minutes of the second preparatory meeting.21 Minutes of the fourth preparatory meeting.22Agenda of the fourth preparatory meeting.
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how bitter it may taste or (2) go through tthe complicated and difficult
process of constitution amending so as to deprive the Legislative Yuan
the authority to legislate on this matter. As the situation now stands,
however, the Assembly is not endowed with any authority to override
the legislation of the Legislative Yuan in this and other matters. Nor
is there any legal basis for forming such an organization of joint sitting
of committees as between the United States House of Representatives
and Senate which may be utilized to solve legislative disputes between
the Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. In view of this the wisdom of
Article 34 of the Constitution is certainly subject to question.
B. THE QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE AND AGENDA
With the settlement of the problem of Presidium, the Assembly
terminated its preparatory stage, which covered altogether six meet-
ings, beginning on March 30 and ending on April 5. Henceforth the
Assembly entered its formal stage, which consisted of altogether six-
teen plenary meetings and five election meetings, and three days of
committee meetings to scrutinize bills of various nature.
As previously pointed out, the primary purpose for which the Assem-
bly was summoned to meet was the election of the President and the
Vice-President, but even the exercise of this relatively simple function
had, however, to be preceded by the adoption of the rules of procedure
and items of the agenda in order to facilitate the transaction of business
on the floor. Then the various committees provided for in the Organiza-
tion Law also had to be formed in due time. These therefore became the
first items of business for the Assembly and they were duly taken up
one by one in the following order- (i) rules of procedure in the first,
second, third, and four plenary meetings on April 6, 7, 8, and 9 respec-
tively, (2) adoption of agenda in the fifth plenary meeting on April io,
(3) Committee on Credentials, second plenary meeting, April 7, (4)
Committee on Discipline, same meeting, (5) Committee on Bills, same
meeting. Bills for their adoption were, therefore, introduced to the
Assembly by the Presidium in its name as Presidium. But the author
had reasons to believe that the Presidium as a body was not solely
responsible for their preparation, and that many, if not all, of these
bills or drafts were actually prepared by the Preparatory Committee
for the Assembly in anticipation of its convocation.
Of these bills, we perhaps do not need to bother about those dealing
with the Committees, even though about each of them there was a cus-
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tomary debate in the Assembly Suffice it to say that all these bills
passed the Assembly rather smoothly Thus the bill concerning creden-
itals and that concerning the discipline were passed in the second
plenary meeting on April 5. The bill dealing with Committee on Bills
was passed in the fourth plenary meeting on April 9 .2S The other two
problems were, however, much more knotty and interesting in their
course of passage through the Assembly, and they also raised some
interesting points of law In order to fully appraise the situation, it is
necessary for us to here dwell on the political atmosphere existing at the
time when both the proposed Rules of Procedure and the proposed
agenda came up for debate in that body Mention has been made more
than once previously of that election, and election alone was intended
as the business of the Assembly when it was being convoked. But as
soon as, if not before, the Assembly met, the representatives began to
show a very general dissatisfaction toward the government's impotency
to cope with the critical situation both at home and abroad. Much had
happened between the termination of the Constituent Assembly and
the opening of the first session of the present Assembly to make the
representatives feel unhappy about the government. Especially note-
worthy are the enlargement of the Communist area, the increasing rise
in commodity prices, the unabated or rather increasing corruption, and
inefficiency inside the government. Certainly the representatives had
plenty to say and propose in the Assembly It is against such a back-
ground that the bills concerning procedural rules and agenda were
taken up. The author must also add that even without such a back-
ground the Assembly would perhaps still find reasons to expand its
functions as this kind of tendency is quite natural with organs of this
nature.
The Draft Law of Procedure as introduced into Assembly by "its
Presidium consisted of thirteen chapters and sixty-six articles. "4 As a
whole it follows pretty closely the parliamentary practice in Western
countries as well as the precedents of its predecessor bodies. It was dis-
cussed article by article in the Assembly, and there was routine debate
on many points with which we need not bother in view of the limited
space. But one of its articles, however, calls for special attention, and
that is its Article 17, which reads, "the scope of the bills will be limited
to within what is provided for in Article 27 of the Constitution." We
are not quite clear as to what is the motive of the Presidium in so
23 Consult the minutes of these meetings respectively.24 Agenda of the first plenary meeting.
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phrasing Article i 7 of the Draft Law of Procedure. That it has the
effect of very much narrowing down the scope of the Assembly's activi-
ties there is no doubt, for as previously mentioned, according to the
said Article 2 7 of the Constitution, functions of the Assembly are lim-
ited to (i) election of the President and the Vice-President, (2) recall
of the President or the Vice-President, (3) amendment of the Consti-
tution, (4) ratification of amendments to the Constitution proposed
by the Legislative Yuan. The proposed Article 17 was therefore greatly
resented by those members who felt that they had many grievances
to express and many bills to introduce. After suffering from the con-
centrated vocal bombardment of the representatives, the said law of
procedure was finally amended so as to delete the substance of Article
17 from it altogether, and to give the Assembly untrammelled authority
to consider any type of bill.2"
The temper of the Assembly also had its effect on the contents of the
agenda, for we noticed that in spite of the government's well-known
unwillingness, the proposed agenda when submitted by the Presidium
to the Assembly contained items upon which the representatives had
insisted during the course of the previous debate, such as the debate
on the government's policies, consideration of ordinary bills, and
amendment of the Constitution. These items were placed along side
with the election of the President and the Vice-President, which was
first considered as the only business of the Assembly 28 Thus the right
of the Assembly to debate on the government policies and to initiate
bills of whatever nature aside from those pertaining to amending the
Constitution was given full recognition in the proposed agenda. This
is, of course, a great victory on the part of the Assembly The reason
is that during the course of several days of debate in the Assembly the
members of the Presidium and perhaps many government leaders had
been thoroughly educated as to the futility and inadvisability of check-
ing the Assembly's determination and will to initiate debate on govern-
ment policies and to introduce bills. They therefore yielded in the face
of the barrage from the floor and inserted those items demanded by
the representatives.
Two or three other points in connection with the question of agenda
have also to be discussed here. One relates to the insertion therein of
the bill to amend the Constitution. As has been previously mentioned,
25 Minutes of the first, second, and third plenary meetings.
28 See the Draft Agenda for the session attached to the Agenda of the fifth plenary
meeting.
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the settled policy of the government is to oppose any amendment to the
Constitution in this session of the Assembly In spite of this, however,
the momentum to amend the Constitution became very manifest as soon
as the session was called, as did the dissatisfaction towards the govern-
ment which, perhaps, was among the contributing causes of this mo-
mentum. Especially vociferous on this point were a group of represen-
tatives of Kuomintang affiliation who were avowedly dissatisfied with
the Constitution as promulgated in 1947 Their reasons were as fol-
lows: (i) the 1947 Constitution was not in consonance with Dr. Sun's
teachings, (2) the Constitution was based on a draft drawn up at the
time of the Kuomintang-Commumst parley and hence imposed upon
the Kuomintang, (3) the Constitution does not provide the Assembly
with adequate powers and facilities to enable it to function effectively
Especially objectionable to them is the provision i, the Constitution to
the effect that the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum
has to wait for such powers to be exercised first by the people of a half
number of all the hsten and muicipalities within the country and also
the fact that the only assured session of the Assembly is the one stipu-
lated to take place ninety days prior to the date of expiration of the
term of each presidency 2 In view of this, the demand for amending
the Constitution became very persistent and the result was that time
was specially reserved in the agenda for debating on bills to this end
quite irrespective of the government's policy and also the fact that the
Constitution had as yet just began operation.
The other questions relate to the terminal date for handing in the
bills and the priority of the various items on the agenda. As originally
planned, the terminal date for handing in the bills was fixed on Satur-
day, April Xo,2 ' and that for handing in bills amending the Constitution
on Wednesday, April 14.2" This latter day was generally considered
acceptable, but as to the former date, the majority considered it too
restrictive and short. After some debate it was therefore decided to
extend the period of handing in ordinary bills to terminate on Satur-
day, April z 7.10 As to the question of priority, the original arrangement
in the proposed agenda was to give first priority to the debate on gov-
ernment policies, second priority to the consideration of the Constitu-
tional Amendment, third priority to the election of the President,
2 7 Articles 27 and 29 of the Constitution.28 Agenda of the second plenary meeting.
29 Draft Agenda of the session attached to the Agenda of the fifth plenary meeting.
SO See the Agenda for the Session passed by the Fifth Plenary Meeting attached to
the Minutes of the same meeting.
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fourth priority to committee consideration of ordinary bills, fifth pri-
ority to the election of the Vice-President, and finally the last priority
to the consideration of the bills by plenary meetings.3' This, of
course, might somehow affect the consideration of ordinary bills as it
is expected that immediately after the election of the Vice-President-
the most absorbing item on the agenda-many representatives might
leave Nanking so that there might not be enough of them left to make
a quorum. In fact, many representatives read into the proposed agenda
the intention of the government to sabotage their effort to consider the
ordinary bills. So after a rather heated debate the order of priority in
the proposed agenda was finally amended so as to place the considera-
tion of the bills before the election of the Vice-President which now
became the last main item on the agenda. 2 The triumph of the Assem-
bly is by now complete, and more than 8oo bills of various nature were
thus introduced into the Assembly and passed by it in accordance with
the Rules of Procedure.
C. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE ASSEMBLY'S ASSERTION OF POWERS
What then is the legal basis and significance of this development?
We will leave for future discussion the question of amendment to the
Constitution, but will here deal with the question of the Assembly's
assertion to debate on the government's policies and to initiate bills.
With regard to this point, it is to be noted that while the present poli-
tical situation in China may furnish some justification, there is, how-
ever, absolutely no written authorization in the Constitution which may
possibly be cited to support the claims of the Assembly The only pos-
sible legal defense that has been invoked is that the Assembly, being
the legal sovereign of China, as explained above, can %pso facto exercise
any kind of power that is not incompatible with the express provisions
of the Constitution. To push the reasoning further, it has been argued
that because of the Assembly's sovereign nature its authority was sup-
posed to be complete except insofar as it may be bound by the express
provisions of the Constitution, which in a way constitute the exceptions
to the Assembly's complete authority
To the author, this line of reasoning looks rather forced and unten-
able. The reason is that the Constitution does enumerate in specific
detail the powers of the various organs of the government. The power
to initiate debate on governmental policies and to introduce bills under
82 See the Draft Agenda.
82 See the Agenda for the session passed by the fifth plenary meeting.
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the present arrangement belongs to the Legislative Yuan and the Con-
trol Yuan, and there is no provision in the Constitution reserving to
the Assembly what we may call "residuary power" in case of the enu-
merations being inexhaustive or doubtful. The Assembly must there-
fore be able to point to a specific authorization in the Constitution in
order to enable it to initiate debates and introduce bills and cannot pos-
sibly just rely on the absence of any provision to the contrary in the
Constitution. The assumption or the exercise of these powers by the
Assembly without proper authorization of the Constitution, therefore,
certainly does look arbitrary and unconstitutional, since it conflicts
with the powers of the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. This is
especially so since, as the author has explained previously, the powers
to initiate debate, etc., belong to the level of ordinary legislation and
are therefore inferior to the Constitution. Considering the matter in
this light, we must, of course, pronounce the Assembly's assertion to
the right to initiate debate and introduce bills as ultra vires. As such,
bills passed by the Assembly must be considered as devoid of any
binding force on the government.
On the other hand, it is to be submitted that constant practice may
make custom, and unconstitutional practice if indulged in frequently
may harden into a convention having legal force. In this connection it
may be of interest to note that the government departments instead of
protesting against this assertion of power on the part of the Assembly
has so far submitted to it rather courteously as evidenced by the fact
that they have appeared before the floor to report on the affairs en-
trusted to their charge in response to the Assembly's request and to
answer the questions posed by the individual representatives. The
author would not, therefore, be surprised at all if, irrespective of its
unconstitutionality, the practice of the Assembly in this matter may
mature into a precedent for the succeeding session until perhaps such
practice is ultimately legitimized by the maturity of the conditions for
the Assembly's assumption of the rights of initiative and referendum.
In view of the past experiences of the representative organs of other
countries, as well as the last session of the Assembly, this tendency
seems to be quite inevitable, and in the interest of the healthy develop-
ment of democracy it may also be considered as desirable. But then, of
course, the questions of operation, control, and adjustment will come
up. It would seem wise for those concerned to think through those
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points beforehand so that when the time comes they may be able to
guide the Assembly's growth and development.
D. THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
With respect to the question of Constitutional Amendment, it is
necessary to state that altogether thirteen bills connected with this
problem in one form or another were introduced into the Assembly 83
Because of the limited space the author will immediately say that of
these thirteen bills only two deserve our special attention. They are
(i) Mr. Chang Chi Pen's bill to amend Articles 27 and 29 of the Con-
stitution and (2) Mr. Moh Teh Hui's bill granting emergency power
to the President. Mr. Chang's bill is important because it attempts to
enlarge the power of the Assembly and has therefore the support of a
large majority of the representatives. Its chief features are: (i) the
Assembly shall have the power to initiate principles of legislation, (2)
the Assembly shall have the power to review any legislation that affects
the rights and obligations of the people, (3) the Assembly shall have
the right to pass laws itself with a view to exercising the two rights
mentioned above and the right to amend the Constitution, and (4) the
Assembly shall meet once in every two years, and in case of the expira-
tion of the President's term of office such meeting to take place ninety
days before the expiration. The bill is thus an attempt to enable the
Assembly to exercise the powers of initiative and referendum at an
earlier date than previously envisaged and to increase the frequency of
its meetings. Its legal consequences in case of its being passed can,
therefore, be somehow forseen in the light of the discussion we have
already had regarding the nature of the Assembly No further elabora-
tion on this point is therefore called for.
On the other hand, Mr. Moh's bill is, however, a move m the oppo-
site direction, as it aims to increase the power of the President in time
of crisis. Since it was finally passed by the Assembly with only slight
additions and has now become law, we may just as well quote the bill
in extenso
Emergency Articles for the Period of Mobilization and Suppressing Dis-
order It is hereby resolved in accordance with the procedure provided for
in Section A, Article 174 of the Constitution to make the following Emer-
gency Articles for the Period of Mobilization and Suppressing Disorder
During the Period of Mobilization and Suppressing Disorder the President,
83 The Assembly has published the original texts of all these bills in two small book-
lets in which the reader may look for further information.
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with a view to preventing the State or the people from incurring impending
dangers, or with a view to coping with great financial or economic crises,
may, with the consent of the Executive Yuan meeting, take emergency
measures, without being bound by the restrictions imposed by the proce-
dure provided for in Articles 39 and 43 of the Constitution.
The Legislative Yuan may in accordance with the procedure provided
for in Section B of Article 57 of the Constitution, change or cancel the
emergency measures mentioned m the previous section.
The termination of the period of Mobilization and Suppressing Disorder
shall be announced by the President; the Legislative Yuan may request the
President to make such an announcement.
The bill is thus a grant of power to the President, and as such it is
not without some pernicious effects on the rights of the people and their
representative organs such as the National Assembly and the Legisla-
tive Yuan. Thus, for example, according to Article 39 of the Consti-
tution, martial law may be declared only with the approval of the
Legislative Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan may request the President
to rescind such law Next, Article 43 of the Constitution stipulates that
while the President may during the recess of the Legislative Yuan
issue emergency decrees to cope with certain categories of situations,
such decrees are, however, subject to the confirmation of the Legisla-
tive Yuan, and the said decrees shall be null and void in case this
latter body dissents. But now by a single provision all these brakes
on the presidential emergency powers are taken away, and the only
way through which the Legislative Yuan may yet exercise some con-
trol over the President is through the procedure provided for in
Section 2 of Article 57 of the Constitution which empowers the Legis-
lative Yuan in case of dissent over any policy to ask for its reconsidera-
tion by the Executive Yuan, and also to override by two-thirds majority
any decision reached by the Executive Yuan after its reconsideration,
such overriding to have the effect of either binding the Executive
Yuan or causing it to resign. Certainly- anybody can see that the bill
constitutes some rather important limitation upon the powers of the
Legislative Yuan.
As concerns the National Assembly, the effects of the bill are cer-
tainly not so conspicuous as in the case of the Legislative Yuan. But it
is submitted that with such a grant of emergency powers the National
Assembly may be signing its own "death warrant," since the need for
another session of the Assembly would then be greatly reduced. As to
the people, it is only necessary to mention that by nature the case of
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emergency powers is always derogatory upon individual rights and
dangerous to personal freedom. Therefore, many people regard rightly
the bill as repugnant to the constitutional guarantees of individual
rights and a retrogressive step. Its only justifications are the critical
times and the communist menace which China is facing.
The introduction of these rather contradictory bills into the Assem-
bly brings a dilemma both to the government leaders and the repre-
sentatives. It now becomes rather difficult for the government to frown
upon the move to amend the Constitution since it is interested, and
even itself instigated the Emergency Power Bill, which decidedly
touches upon the very heart of the Constitution. To the representa-
tives, the Emergency Power Bill is, of course, distasteful, but they
seem to have no other choice since the Republic is facing a most serious
crisis. Moreover, since many of them are interested in their own
amendment proposals, they also hope that acceptance of the Emer-
gency Power Bill may facilitate the passage of their own bills.
With a setting like this, all bills were, therefore, duly brought up
on the floor, debated, and referred to the Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.' There a deadlock developed, for while the government
insisted that the Emergency Power Bill should pass, a majority of the
members, opposed by a determined minority, were equally insistent
that other amendments-especially Mr. Chang Chih Pen's bill-should
also pass."5 In order to solve this dilemma and secure the passage of
the Emergency bill, persuasion in one form or another was several
times used in order to whip the members into obedience. The issue
was finally solved by a compromise arrangement in which the majority
of representatives agreed to support the Emergency Power Bill in its
original form while the government in consideration of this pledged
itself to summon an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly to con-
sider the question of amending the Constitution not later than Decem-
ber 25, igo.11 The latter clause was finally added to the bill and
reported back by the Committee to the Assembly Its exact wording
was as follows: "The President shall summon an Extraordinary Ses-
sion of the First National Assembly not later than December 25th of
the 39th year of the Republic in order to discuss the various bills
34 The Agenda of the ninth plenary meeting; cf. the minutes of the same meeting.
a5 Minutes of the eleventh plenary meeting; cf. the report of the chairman of the
Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
86 This compromise was reached in a Kuo Ming Tang meeting, where Generalissimo
Chiang, functioning as its President, utilized his position and prestige to whip the Kuo
Ming Tang representatives into accepting this proposal.
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having to do with the amendment of the Constitution. If at the time
of the Convocation of the Session, the Period of Mobilization and
Suppressing Disorder is not yet terminated in accordance with the
provisions of the preceding Section, then the Extraordinary Session
of the First National Assembly shall consider whether the Emergency
Articles shall be prolonged or whether it should be cancelled." In its
original form and with the above quoted addition! the bill finally
passed the Assembly in its twelfth meeting on April 18.87 The author
only wishes to add that because of tins act the Assembly engendered
a good deal of public opprobrium.
E. ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT,
THE PROBLEM OF INTERIM SESSION ORGANIZATION
With the disposal of the legal problems arising from the Assembly's
assertion to initiate debate and introduce bills and to amend the Con-
stitution, we have really covered the major problems of the last session.
There still remains, however, the two problems of the election and the
interim organization. Of these two, we may say that although election
of the President and the Vice-President constitutes the major function
of the last session, and is politically of great consequence, it is how-
ever, not so important from the legal point of view as in exercising
tins power the Assembly is strictly acting within its constitutional
powers, and no serious points of law are involved. This is especially
so with the election of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as the Presi-
dent of China. The election of the Vice-President also is conducted
strictly within the law But in this latter case, two small questions of
the law should, however, be discussed. They are (i) whether the
candidate has the right to relinquish his candidacy during the process
of the election and/or whether the Assembly has the right to over-
ride such relinquishment, and (2) to what extent the competing candi-
dates should be allowed to indulge in antagomzing propaganda, and
to what extent they should be allowed to use influence with the repre-
sentatives-influence such as entertainments, gifts, favors, threats, or
even duress.
The Assembly's ruling on the first question seems a little bit equivo-
cal in view of the following facts: (i) the Assembly never faced the
issue squarely as a legal problem but chose to deal with it as a political
problem by allowing the Presidium to use its influence with the candi-
87Report of the Committee on Constitutional Amendments; mnutes of the twelfth
plenary meeting.
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dates concerned, (2) the Assembly proceeded with the election only
after the three candidates promised to abide by its decision, 8 although
such promise was made only orally and was quite different from formal
withdrawal, and their formal communications announcing the relin-
quishment of their candidacy were never withdrawn. But it would
seem that by going ahead with the election in disregard of the formal
relinquishment communications, the Assembly is assuming the atti-
tude that while individual candidates may relinquish their candidacy,
the Assembly's right to elect any particular person is, however, un-
prejudiced by such a move. The author has no doubt that legally such
an attitude is quite correct. As to the question of propaganda and
political influence, so far there has been practically no legislation on
the matter, except the limits prescribed by general criminal law But
in view of indulgence in over-enthusiastic and undesirable propaganda,
and also the use of undue political influence in the last vice-presidential
election, it is quite apparent that some such legislation is very much
called for and should be attended to as early as possible to insure
maximum decorum in political campaigning.
In contradistinction to the question of election, the question of the
interim organization does, however, bring up some points of law In
the Constitution there is no article which may furmsh even the faintest
basis for such an organization. Despite this, altogether twenty bills
looking forward to the establishment of one or another form of in-
terim organization were introduced, and they were all referred to the
Number One Subcommittee of the Committee on Bills. This body, after
scrutinizing and combining them, reported back to the Presidium
with the recommendation that two committees, the Committee for the
Scrutinization of the Constitutional Operation and the Committee for
Constitutional Studies and Discussion be formed in order to check up
the constitutional process, and to study the constitutional law so as to
expedite the government in carrying out the Constitution, and to pre-
pare the way for amending the Constitution in the coming Extraordi-
nary Session of the Assembly, these Committees to be formed out of
the voluntary participation by the representatives."
At the same time, another subcommittee, Number Four Sub-
committee, which deals with economic matters, also recommended, in
38 Report of Representative Yfi Ping; minutes of the fourth vice-presidential election
meeting.
so Report Number 7 of the Number Three Subcommittee of the Committee on Bills,
annexed to the agenda of the fifteenth plenary meeting.
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view of the great quantity of the bills dealing with economic matters,
the organization by the Assembly of a National People's Economic
Studies Committee to be composed of (i) one representative elected
by each of the various units of the Assembly and (2) fifty other repre-
sentatives elected by the Presidium from among those versed in eco-
nomic problems, the purpose of the committee being to study the
various problems connected with the subchapter on People's Eco-
nomics in the Constitution. 40
Both these bills were accepted by the Presidium, but the bills of the
number one subcommittee were amended so as to combine the two
proposed Committees on Constitutional Operation and Constitutional
Studies and Discussion into one Committee of Constitutional Studies
to be formed after the fashion of the Economic Studies Committee."-
When the two bills came up for debate on the floor, the bill on the
Economics Studies Committee was adopted in its original form, but
the bill on constitutional studies which is the interim organization
proper, did not satisfy the representatives and was thus ignored. At
the same time, the original recommendation of the number one sub-
committee was again amended so as to combine the two committees
proposed therein into one committee to be known as the Committee
for the Supervision and Direction of Constitutional Work to be
charged with the function of (i) supervising and directing constitu-
tional execution, (2) studying and discussing the Constitution. The
Committee is to be further divided into four subcommittees on the
following matters: business, propaganda, study and survey; and the
representatives are to join only one of those subcommittees at their
own free will. As thus amended the bill passed the Assembly4 To-
gether with the People's Economics Studies Committee, they therefore
constitute the interim session organizations of the Assembly
Of these two interim session organizations, it would seem that there
is no question of constitutionality with the People's Economics Study
Committee, since its functions are purely limited to the study of the
economic articles of the Constitution. But the Committee for Super-
vising and Directing Constitutional Operation presents a very different
problem. The reason is that it is quite possible for this organization to
40 Report Number 2 of the Number Four Subcommittee of the Committee on Bills,
Ibtd.
41 Report of the Presidium re report of the Number One Subcommittee; minutes of
the sixteenth plenary meeting.
42 Minutes of the sixteenth plenary meeting. Cf. also minutes of the fifteenth plenary
meeting for information re the Economics Studies Committee.
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duplicate and to interfere with the functions of the Legislative, the
Control or even the Judicial Yuan, and thus to give rise to the question
of constitutionality of its functions and actions, or even its own raison
d'etre. At this writing this Committee is still within its preparatory
stage, and it seems that the government is quite conscious of its doubt-
ful constitutionality and is not very enthusiastic about its being formed
too quickly Its constitutionality will thus depend upon its future ac-
tivities. In this connection it is interesting to note that unconnected
with the National Assembly and entirely outside of it, the government
has during the last session of the Assembly announced the establish-
ment of a so-called Committee for Mobilization and the Suppression
of Disorder, the members of which are to include all the representa-
tives of the National Assembly, especially those who are otherwise
employed. Many have interpreted this as a move to divide the interest
of the representatives in the Committee for Supervising and Directing
Constitutional Operation, and to divert their attention to the Com-
mittee for Mobilization and the Suppression of Disorder, the member-
ship of which, unlike that of the National Assembly, is paid for.
CONCLUSION
From the above analysis we can thus see that although under the
present constitutional arrangement China's National Assembly is
meant more or less to be an organ of political power, its nature as a
representative organ, is, however, not yet settled, and that the prob-
lem of its future adjustment with other representative and government
organs remains to be worked out. In other words, we may say that
although the designers of the 1947 Constitution had made some serious
efforts to tackle this very fundamental and important problem, they
have so far not yet succeeded in working out its rational and perma-
nent solution. In the author's opinion, this certainly is one of the very
bad defects of the 1947 Constitution, and one of the reasons for its
existence would seem to be that the designers did not dare take too
much liberty with Dr. Sun's teachings, which as far as concerns this
matter are unfortunately somehow irritated by their being involved
in complexities.
On the other hand, the experiences of the first session of the Assem-
bly would seem to indicate that sooner or later the Assembly is bound
to develop into just another legislative organ in spite of the many
shortcomings and defects of its present makeup. Also there is no doubt
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that it will seize the earliest possible opportunity available to amend
the Constitution along this direction. Thus viewed, it is therefore one
of China's foremost constitutional problems, and the government shall
certainly make every timely and conscientious effort to face the ques-
tion squarely and to seek a wise and permanent solution in anticipation
of such a development. On the contrary, there is no use in dodging the
issue. Such a course will only end in further complicating the problem.
A bold, broad, and statesmanlike initiative is thus needed in order to
secure its solution.
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Sovi CrviL LAw" Private Rights and their Background under the Soviet Regime.
Comparative Survey and Translation of the Civil Code; Code of Domestic Relations;
Judiciary Act; Code of Civil Procedure; Laws on Nationality, Corporations, Pat-
ents, Copyright; Collective Farms, Labor; and other Related Laws. Volume I, Com-
parative Survey. By Vladimir Gsovski. Foreword by Hessel E. Yntema. Ann Arbor"
University of Michigan Law School, 1948. Pp. xxxvii + 909. Price. $10. (Volumes
I and II, per set, $15.)
Of late, considerable interest has been manifested in the United States in Soviet
law. Numerous articles and pamphlets by such specialists in the field as John Hazard
and Rudolf Schlesinger's study of Soviet Legal Theory (1945) have reflected this in-
terest. In 1948 two works of note became available-Andrei Vyshinsky's The Law of
the Soviet State (translated by Hugh W Babb) and Vladimir Gsovski's Soviet Civil
Law (comparative survey and translation). While Vyshinsky's work will no doubt
continue for some time to come to be the foremost Soviet interpretation of Soviet law,
the present work by Gsovski is likely to become the standard American text on Soviet
civil law. Whereas Vyshmsky's study is for the most part polemical and argumentative,
Gsovski's is objective m approach and provides a more up-to-date and comprehensive
comparative survey of the primary and secondary sources, including the contribution of
Vyshinsky himself. It is, moreover, substantiated by the translation (Volume II) of the
major codes, laws, and documents-the primary sources of Soviet civil law.
Soviet Civil Law, included in the Michigan Legal Studies, is the product of many
years of painstaking research. In 1940 the University of Michigan Law School took
over from the U.S. Department of Commerce an English translation of the Judiciary
Law of the U.S.S.R. and of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure of the
R.S.F.S.R. prepared by Morton E. Kent, and assigned the work of revision to Dr.
Vladinur Gsovski, Chief of the Foreign Law Section of the Library of Congress. Dr.
Gsovski has not only revised and increased the basic documentary materials on Soviet
civil law, but has prepared the exhaustive treatise on the subject which comprises
Volume I-the volume covered m this review.
Volume I of Soviet Civil Law is divided into two main parts, the first of which is
devoted to a general survey and the second to a series of special topics. Part One covers
such topics as the initial stages of the Soviet regime (prior to 1936), the present politi-
cal, economc, and social order, Soviet concepts of law in general and of private law,
and the role of the judiciary. Part Two includes an analysis of the discontinuity of pre-
revolutionary law and vested rights, the conditional protection of private rights, the
rights of aliens and foreign corporations, corporations and other legal entities in Soviet
